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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah
EB\VIN U.

~IOSEH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

·ziox~s

COOPERATIVE nlEBCANTILE INSTITUTION, a corporation,
and JOHN A. ROGEBS,
Defendants a;nd Appellants.

7148

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, referred to hereafter as plaintiff; sued
appellants, who will be referred to hereafter as defendants, to recover damages for injuries which he sustained
in an automobile accident. The trial of the cause in the
court below resulted in a verdict in plaintiff's favor and
defendants have brought this appeal to secure a reversal of said judgn1ent.
The accident occurred on the lOth day of October,
194;') at approximately 7 :30 p.m. on U.S. Highway 91
near what is known as the Black~mith's Fork River
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Bridge, about ll/2 miles south of Logan, Utah (Tr. 18,
14 30 31 86 87 98 177 195 197, 198, 228). Plain tifi'
' driving
' ' 'his ' autonwbile
'
' toward
'
was
Logan, Utah and
defendant Rogers was driving the truck of defendant
Z. C. M. I., his employer, southerly in the direction of
Salt Lake City (Tr. 31, 32, 49, 177, 179, 197, 198, 274)~
The highway at the point of accident runs in a northeasterly and southwesterly direction and at and near
the point of accident ,was straight for a considerable
distance (Ex. "D," "E" and "H;" Tr. 10, 11, 15, 33,
54, 199). The collision between these two rnotor vehieles
occurred Ojl that stretch of highway because one <Jf the
drivers got over onto the wrong side of the road.
It should here be pointed out and ernphasized that
there is a sharp and direct conflict in the testimony as
to which driver was at fault. Plaintiff and his wife and
aunt, who were -riding with him, all testified that de. fendant Rogers 'vas at fault. On the other hand, Rogers,
who was alone in1 the truck, is just as emphatic that
plaintiff caused the accident by getting over into his
lane of traffic (Tr. 34, 35, G3, 56, G7, ;>9, 60, 61, 87, 89,
94,95,103,200,201).
I

I

The conflict in the evidence is irreconcilable both
upon the extent of damages and upon the question of
liability. Since the finding of lia'bility and the extent of
damages depended entirely upon the credibility of plaintiff and his witnesses, it was an abuse of discretion for
the trial judge to deny a n,ew trial and prevent the production of ne,:vly discovered evidence which, if believed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I
hy the jury, \vould have n1uch reduced the award of dmnage:' if liability were found or would have so ilnpaired the
credibility of plaintiff and his wife as to result in a
finding of no liability.

\Ve will endeavor to show that the testimon~· of
plaintiff, his wife and aunt put a strain upon the credu.lity of the jury which would have been too great if the
newly discovered testimony had been presented to them.
The testimony of the truck driver on the other hand was
so strongly buttressed by the testilnony of disinterested
witnesses that certainly 1naterial evidence impairing the
credibility of plaintiff and minimizing the extent of the
lamage "'uffered by him in the collision would probably
change the result. This will be en1phasized especially in
view of the personal relationship, acquaintance and obvious interest and bias of plaintiff, members of his
fmnily and close friends.
Xotwithstanding plaintiff asked damages from the
jury upon the basis of a permanently and seriously impajred 1nen1ory, nevertheless he was willing to testify
that he arrived at the scene of the accident about 7 :30
p.m.; that it was after dark, that he was driving with
hi~ ,dfe seated on his right and his wife's aunt seated
in the right rear seat; that he was driving about 45 1niles
per hour and he was listening to his radio (Tr. 32).
Plaintiff claims that he first saw the approach of defendant's truck when it was north of the bridge and
he knew frmn the headlights that it was an approaching
Y<'hicle. (Tr. 32). It was approximately a. block and a
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half away when plaintiff first paid particular attention
to it ( Tr. ~>-4:). Plaintiff noticed nothing peculiar about
the approach of the truck until it came onto the bridge
when he claiins the lights appeared to jerk to one side
giving him the impression it had hit some object, though
from that distance he was unable to say it actually hit
anything ( Tr. 34, 55). Even then, by plain tiff's own
statement, the truck continued to approach in a perfectly normal manner all the way across the bridge \Vith
nothing to indicate that anything was wrong until it
had cmnpletely crossed the bridge. All of this time the
truck aclrnittedly remained on its own proper side of the
road (Tr. 34, 56). Plaintiff then claims that when the
truck had cleared the bridge by 10 to 15 feet it suddenly,
for no apparent reason at all, swerved over into his lane
of travel when he was only 60 feet away from the point
of impact. As suddenly as it swerved into his path it
swerve<l back again so that the front end of the truck
di(l not come in contact with plaintiff's car at all (Tr.
35, 57, 58, Ex. "B ").
Though plaintiff had, by his own adn1ission, but a
split second to estimate distances, and although he
claimed a seriously impaired memory, he contended that
his own car was within two feet of the southeasterly edge
of the pavement, but that the truck came over onto his
side of the pavement a minimum of 5 feet and perhaps as much as 10 feet (Tr. 59, 60, 61, 62). In a distance
of 60 feet with plaintiff's car travelling 45 ~iles per hour
and defendant's truck travelling 40 miles per hour (Tr.
61. 62) plaintiff asserts t~at defendant's truck, which was
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not a se1ni-trailer type (Tr. H)5, Ex ''F") did a veritable jack-knife nutneuver and was so manipulated by
the driver that it could swerve sharpely over onto the
highway from its own side of the road and be brought
back so abruptly and suddenly that only the rear portion of ~t collided with plaintiff's car (Tr. 62, gx. ''F").
Faye :.\[oser, wife of plaintiff and seated to his right
on the front seat, testified to much the same effect as
plaintiff and stated that after the truck swerved onto
the side of the highway her husband was travelling on
and then suddenly swerved back again, the rear of the
truck presented the appearance of a signboard obstructing the path of plaintiff's car ('Tr. 87, 94, 95).
~Irs.

.;
;

'r.
I~

Coral Jones, ~irs. :Moser's aunt, seated in the
_right rear seat (Tr. 32), admittedly reclining and with
her eyes shut, if not dozing, states that upon a sudden
exclmnation fron1 :.\frs. :Moser that a car was on plaintiff's side of the highway, opened her ,eyes only to ohserve that plaintiff's car was about to crash into a"' sign
board" (Tr. 99). ~Irs. Jones never did see the front of
defendant's truck because she still had her eyes closed
Ydten it went past where she was sitting and she did not
know even then that it was a truck. The ilnpact was so
sudden that .:\f rs. Jones did not even have time to bernnle :-;tartled by what was happening ('Tr. 103). In
spite of this situation, ~frs. J on~s 1nakes the claim that
plaintiff was on the right side of the highway.
On the other hand, Rogers, driver of the truck and
co-defendant, testified that he first paid particular atSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tention to the approach of plaintiff's car when it was
frorr1 200 to 300 feet away. He was driving the truck on
his own side of the highway and denied emphatically
that he hit the end of the bridge in driving ?nto it ( Tr.
199). As Rogers drov,e onto the bridge, he noticed plaintiff's car edge over onto his side of the highway. It
gradually edged over the center line and when he was
approximately half way across it became apparent to
him that plaintiff's car wasn't going to get back over
on its own side. Thereupon Rogers drove over to the
right side as far as he possibly could and scraped the
right bridge rail (Tr. 200, 209). As soon as the truck
cleared the bridge, Rogers got the right wheels out onto
the right shoulder (Tr. 201) where they rerrl'ained until
the truck finally rolled into the barrow pit following
the collision.
Plaintiff's car hit the truck just in front of the left
rear wheels (Tr. 202). Rogers fixes the point of impact
at 35 to 40 feet southwest of the bridge (Tr. 208, 211).
After the impact the truck continued along the right
shoulder of the highway at a slight angle and finally
cmne to rest in the barrow pit 117 feet south of the bridge
on its own right side of the highway (Tr. 201).
Plaintiff was unable to state the position of the vehicles after the impact. Neither did Mrs. Moser testify
where the plaintiff's car was situated upon the highway CTr. 90). Plaintiff was rendered unconscious by the
accident and clairned he knew nothing of events which
occurred for several days thereafter (Tr. 36, 100). :Mrs.
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Jones clai1ns to have noted that plaintiff's car was not
over the center line of the highway after the accident
( Tr. 101 ), but her biased observation, made in a m01nent
of great excite1nent, was in conflict 'vith physical 1narks
left by the vehicles and the testimony of numerous disinterested witnesses.
Defendant Rogers was not seriously hurt b~· the
.accident. He was able to disengage'himself from the front
~eat of his truck and came up onto the highway and made
observations of the scene of the collision. He noticed
plaintiff's car with its front end two feet over the yellow
or center line on his side of the road ('Tr. 202). He followed the tracks made by his truck fron1 the point where
it was overturned in the barrow pit to the southwest
corner of the bridge. These tire marks were c.Iear and
distinct and were upon the right shoulder of the highwa~·
(Tr. 202). He examined the marks on the right side of
the bridge, which were 18 to 20 feet long on the right
rail, and which continued to the southwest corner of the
bridge (Tr. 203, 204, Ex. "E"). Rogers was emphatic in
his denial that he encroached upon plaintiff's side of
the highway (Tr. 201).
Lt. Da~·, an Army doctor, and his companions were
following defendant's truck (Tr. 179). He traveled in
that position for a considerable distance and until after
the accident. He testified positive!~, that defendant's
truck did not get onto the· wrong side of the highway
(Tr. 182, 191). After the accident, Lt. Day observed the
position of plaintiff's car and testified that the ·front.
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end of it was over the center line of the highway on the
side of defendant's truck, as much as 2 to ~) feet (Tr.
181, i82, 189). According to Lt. Day, the .;..loser car was
about 60 feet fron1 the bridge (Tr.180).
Officer Ree8e, highway patrolrnan for the State of
Utah, was upon the scene of the accident a few minutes
after it happened (Tr . 228). He investigated the accident very thoroughly and his examination showed that
the front end of plaintiff's car was about two feet uver
the center line of the highway in the travelled portion
thereof in which defendant's truck had been travelling
(Tr. 229). According to Officer Reese, the automobile
wa~ standing about 50 feet south of the bridge in the
approxiumte center of the road, the left front wheel
over the center line (Tr. 230). No skid 1narks from the
application of brakes were found upon the higlnva:~, and
the impact occurred about where plaintiff's car was
standing after the collision (Tr. 231). Officer Reese was
able. to trace the path of the truck from the point where
it left the bridge to the place where it came to rest in·
the barrow pit on the right side of the highway. He made
positive identification of this tire mark by comparing it
with the tire tread on the right front wheel of the truck
(Tr. 233 to 236, 253, 254). This inspection proved beyond
doubt that defendant's truck remained at all ti1nes on its
side of the highway ('Tr. 237). In all of his testimony,
Officer Reese is corroborated by Officer Gray of Logan
City (Tr. 260, 261, 263, 264). Officer Edwards of Logan
City was also at the scene of the accident, and while he
did not conduct or make the measurements and the inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Ye~tip1tion

that wa~ 1nade b~· officers Heese and (; rny,
he neYerthelet>s noted the location of the plaintiff's ear
in the center of the highway (Tr. 272, 27:3).
In an atten1pt to support his own testiinony that
defendant ·s truck violated his side of the highway, and
the state1nents of his wife and aunt to the san1e effect,
plaintiff produced the witnesses Blaine :Moser, his
nephew (Tr. 71), :3Ir. Hickn1an, a life insurance salesman (Tr. 105), ~fr. :.JicMurdie, a friend (Tr. 147) and
:Jfr. Haws, still another close friend (Tr. 165). Those
,\-itnesses did not visit the scene of the colli'Sion to 1nake
observations until the next day (Tr. 72, 105, 148, 165).
"\Vhen they arrived there, plaintiff's automo·bile had been
removed frmn the scene, all the debris left upon the
highway by the collision had been swept up and deposited on the easterly si(le of the high·way, and defendant's truck had been righted upon its wheels in the
barrow pit by the use of heavy road equipment and
numerous automobiles had passed the scene of the accident (Tr. 230, 232, Ex. "D," 246, 247, 249, 262, 263,
205, 237' 238, 260, 244, 228, 185).
Under these circumstances, Blaine ~foser, Hickman,
'J f~)Iurdie and Haws set about to reconstruct the happenings of the previous night. They testified that certain
wheel tracks were found upon the highway which led in
the direction of the truck from a point where they found
debri~

and auto parts upon the easterly side of the high-

way. Apparently they ·were innocently deceived by the
faet that the debris had been ren1oved from the place of
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impact to the southeast side of the high\vay. They therefore erroneously assumed that this debris ~'as still at the
place where the collision had occurred, not knowing at
the time of their visit that it had ,been earlier swept up
and placed where they found it the next morning ( Tr.
72, 75,, 79, 106, 111, 150, 151, 154, 159, Ex. '' D,'' 160,
167, 169, 170).
Both ~lc~l urdie and Haws admitted that if their assumptions with respect to the location of the debris were
erroneous then their conclusions as to the point of impact would necessatily be incorrect (Tr. 163, 172). There
was no testimony by any of these four witnesses which
identified the wheel mnrks which they saw the next day
as those which the truck had Inade.
Further com1nent upon this phase of the evidence
will be res·erved for appellant's argument. It is neces- sary, however, to call atte~tion to other matters of evidence upon which appellants rely for a reversal. This
evidence goes not alone to the credibility of plaintiff's
testimony, which we submit is seriously affected thereby,
but also to the question of damages.
Plaintiff testified that he sustained severe head .
injuries in the accident which rendered him unconscious
(Tr. 36, 38). His aunt, Mrs. Jones, confirms his unconscious state ( Tr. 100). For several days plaintiff
claims he had no recollection of ev·ents around him (Tr.
36, 63). His physician attested to his mental confusion
(Tr. 125, 136, 137), and stated further that plaintiff
sustained a severe concussion of the brain (Tr. 134).
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As a direct result of these head injuries it was claimed
by plaintiff and his doctor that plaintiff can1e out of the
accident with a pern1antly ilnpaired ability to rernemher.
This condition was n1anifested by an inability to recall
the faces of old and fan1iliar friends; to retain in menlory data having to do with his work without writing it
down ( Tr. 47, 134, 145, 146, 147). He was characterized
by his physician as a man with a "foggy memory" (Tr.
145).
It is quite evident that the references made to the
injury to the brain and the consequential loss of mernory
was for the purpose of inducing the jury to enhance the
plaintiff's verdict. If the damage in this respect was
over-emphasized for this purpose, defendants submit that
the same te1nptation prompted plaintiff and his wife and
aunt to color the events of the accident and such state~
1nents n1ust of necessity be examined with great care on
the aspect of their credibility. If on the other hand, the
damage to plaintiff's memory was all that was claimed
:-:o that he cannot remember the names and faces of old
and fan1iliar friends, then how can credit be given to his
state1nent that he remembers clearly the events of the
accident so as to definitely state that defendant's truck
was on the wrong side of the road? Either way one looks
at it, the reliability of plaintiff's testimony is open to
serious question. Plaintiff's physician ·related how lm;s
of consciousness obliterates the mernory of events which
occur previous to the unconsciousness (Tr. 136, 137).

Furthern1ore, part of the testimony of plaintiff and
his physician was devoted to detailing very severe in-
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juries to plaintiff's left knee, ankle and shoulder. rrhese
injuries \Vere described not only as serious, but as pennanent in their nature (Tr. 43, 45, 46, 128, 131, 133, 134,
142, 143). Here again the jury was invited to enhance
the verdict in plaintiff's favor. Just how n1uch thi:::;
testimony enhanced the amount of the verdict, of course,
no one can tell, but from the size of it, it may be properly
assumed that this evidence had its effect. The verdict
was unusually large, being for over $34,000.00.

cl

After judgrnent was entered on the verdict, defend-.
ants moved for a new trial specifying among other
grounds the discovery of n~w evidence .( r:rr. 304). In
support of this· nwtion, defendants filed two affidavits
reciting that after the trial had ended ·evidence which
defendants and their counsel had not known about and
which could not have been discovered by the exercise of
diligence had been discovered to the effect that plaintiff
in .1941 and 1946 had been involved in accidents in which
his left knee, ankle and shoulder had been injured, and
that for the accident which occurred
in 1941 he received
certain insurance benefits, and further that the injury
to the ankle and knee occurring in ·1941 had been rated
by his insurance carrier as permanent. The affida-vits
further recite.d that as late -as April 6, 1946 (six nwnths
after the collision here involved) plaintiff had made
statements that he was then suffering no disability by.
reason of injuries to his' left knee and ankle (Tr. 305315).
During the trial, plaintiff, his wife and physician
eon cealed the fact of previous injury and its permanent
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nature, and the jury was permitted to inelude in its
Yerdict some dmnage for injuries frmn which .the affi~.laYits Inake it appear plaintiff had been suffering sinee
1941 and which were in no wa~· connected with the eoliision with defendant's truck on October 10, 1945, and
furthennore that after October 10, 1943 plaintiff claimed
he had received injuries to the left leg, knee and shoulder
in a bus accident which occurred shortly before the trial.
It is c;ontended by defendants that they are entitled to haYe a jury pass upon this evidence, not only
for its i1npeaching effect upon the evidence of plaintiff, his wife and doctor, but also because of its effect
upon the question of what damages, if any, plaintiff is
entitled to receive.

STATEM-ENT OF ERRORS
1. The court erred in overruling and denying deendants "Jiotion for New Trial, which is as follows:

To the abore named pla.imtiff, and
To L. E. X PI son and Samuel J. Ca.rter, his attorneys:

You, and each of you, will please take notice
that the defendant intends to 1nove the court to
vacate and set aside the verdict rendered in the
above cause, and to grant a new trial of said cause,
upon the following grounds, to-wit:
Irregularity in the proceeding·s of the
eourt, jury or adverse pai'ty, abuse of discretion
1.
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14:
by the court which pr·evented the defendants from
having a fair trial.
2.

~1:isconduct

of the jury.

3. Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
4. Excessive damages appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice.
5. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict or decision, and that it is against the
law.
6. Error in law occuring at the trial and
excepted to by the defendants.

7. Newly discovered evidence material for
the defendant which it could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trial.
This motion is made upon the minutes and
records of the court and upon affidavits hereafter to be filed.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker,
Attormeys for D·efendants

(Tr. 304)
2. The court erred in refu~ing to give defendants'
requ_ested instruction No. 1, which was as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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You are instructed that defendants are not
required to explain how or why the collision inYolved in this case occurred. The burden is upon
the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of all
of the evidence that the collision resulted fr01n
the negligence of the defendant. (R. 33)
ARGU~:fENT

.Assign1nent of E.rror No. 1:
It is the earnest contention of defendants that their
Inotion for new trial should have been granted upon two
grounds:
1.

Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the ver-

·)

X ewly discovered evidence material for the de-

diet.

fendants which they could not, with reasonable diligence,
haYe discovered and produced at the trial.
1\,..e shall discuss these two points in the reverse

order named.
In support of the ground stated in their motion of
newly discovered evidence, defendants filed two affidavits (Tr. 304-315). These affidavits set out fully the
newly discovered evidence relied upon and the time and
manner of its discovery. Briefly summarized, the affidavits are to the following effect:
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Coun-sel for defendants first learned of so1ne of the
e~idence on Septe1nber- 20, 1946, the day after the conclusion of the trial and the balance of it about September
' the~selves had n~ knowledge re30, 1946. Defendants
garding it prior to that time. This evidence, if produced
in court, would show that in December 1941 plaintiff was
the owner of a policy of accident insurance in the North
Ainerican Accident Insurance Company of Chicago, Illinois.' On Decen1ber 26, 1941 plaintiff injured his left
knee and ankle in a skiing accident. The ankle was
sprained and the internal semilunar cartilage of the knee
was fractured. Plaintiff called upon his insurance carrier
for payment of the benefits provided by the policy and
received those benefits. The insurance carrier required
reports from plaintiff and his attending physician concerning these injuries and written reports were made to
the company. The reports disclosed that plaintiff was
totally disabled on account of his injuries from December
26, 1941 until January 3, 1942. Fron1 January 3, 1942 until
April 22, 1942 when plaintiff's physician reported to
the insurance company, plaintiff was still partially disabled, and the physician reported o~ April 22, 1942
I

that

disabilit)~

would not be entirely removed for an

additional thirty days. From the 31st of January, 1942
until about the middle of March, 1942, plaintiff's left
leg wa~ in a cast and he was still using crutches on April
22, 1942.
The physician who attended plaintiff was the same
one who testified on his behalf at the trial of this case

'
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and he it was who reported to plaintiff's insurance cmnpany.
On April 22, 1942, when a final s·ettlement was made
with plaintiff for his skiing injuries, the insurance company endorsed the policy excluding liability for any
future injuries which plaintiff might sustain to his left
knee and ankle upon the ground that said knee and ankle
,..-ere pennanently impaired. ·
The affidavits further recite that after plaintiff was
injured in the collision 'with defendant's truck on October
10, 1945, he again called upon North An1erican Accident
Insurance Company for benefit payments under his
policy. In connection with his second claim, the age~t of
the insurance company called upon plaintiff to ascertain
the nature and extent of his injuries. In discussing these
later injuries, plaintiff was asked if he was not claiming
injuries. to his left knee and ankle. On April 6, 1946, according to the affidavit, plaintiff was again asked -if he
was not claiming injuries to his left knee and ankle and
he denied that he was then suffering from such injury.
At that time he further gave the insurance agent a
de1nonstration of his abilit~- to flex and use his knee ancl
ankle.
In addition to the foregoing, one of the affidavits disclosed that on August 22, 1946, just about three weeks
before the trial of this case, plaintiff was a passenger on
a bus of the Union Pacific Stages and was in an accident
on tha,t day in which he clain1ed his left leg and shoulder
and neck had been injured. A settlement was made with
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plaintiff by the Union Pacific Stages on August 2-t,
1946, and at that tirne he exhibited· a 'badly swollen left
ankle and clain1ed injuries to his neck and shoulders from
the bus accident which happened August 22, 1946.
Several counter-affidavits were filed on behalf of
plaintiff (Tr. 316-326). In the counter-affidavits it i8
clailned that plaintiff recovered entirely from his 1941
injuries and on October 10, 1945 was suffering no dis- .
ability on account thereof. It is further denied by plaintiff that he made any representations to. the agent of
North A1nerican Accident Insurance Company in :March
and April of 1946 to the effect that at that time he had
no disability of his left knee and ankle, also that he received no injuries in the bus accident in August 1946.
In plaintiff's counter-affidavits it is admitted that
plaintiff was injured in a skiing accident in December
1941 and that the disability lasted until May 22, 1942. It
is also not denied by the counter-affidavits that plaintiff
was involved in the bus accident which occurred in August 1946, and it is stated in plaintiff's counter-affidavits
that he was paid dan1ages by the Union Pacific Railroad.
\ Ve can only speculate upon the reasons which led
the trial court to rule as he did upon the affidavits of
newly discovered evidence. No reasons for the ruling·
were given at the time it was made. Perhaps the court
was convinced that this evidence, even if it had been
presented at the trial, would have made no su'bstantial
difference in the verdict. The court 1nay have been of
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the opinion that the jury would not have believed this
t•Yidenee, or that its effect would have been entirely
neutralized by the plaintiff's evidence in rebuttal. It
\\-a~. however, not the prerogative of the trial court to
pass upon the effect of this evidence or its credibility.
If it 'vas con1petent for any purpose, and we submit that
it was, then defendants were entitled to have it presented to a jury.
The rule of law which the trial court is bound to
apply in considering affidavits of newly discovered evidence i~ stated in the case of Jensen vs. Logan City, 89
Utah 347. 37 Pac. 2d 708, in which this court said :
"K )Tinan denies that Jeppson talked with
him, but the jury should be allowed to choose
whom to believe.''

In the Jensen case this court had before it for consideration affidavits and counter-affidavits of newly discovered
evidence in connection with a motion for new trial.
In Wood vs. Woo,d, Ky., 65 S.W. 2d 969, this language is used :
''The improbability of the witness' testimony
is strongly and ably argued, but we are not now
concerned with that phase of the case. If the
statements of the witness be true, and that is a
question for the jury, his evidence of the execution and the contents of the will was sufficient to
suppl~' the missing link in the evidence heard on
the trial, and require the suh1nission of the case
to a jury. As there was no other evidence to the
same effeet, it necessarily results that the newly
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discovered evidence was of such a decisive and
controlling character as would probably chall:ge
the result, and therefor,e sufficient to requue
a new trial. * * * * ''
vV e have alr·eady pointed out the great stress and
emphasis which plaintiff and his doctor placed upon the
injuries to the left knee, ankle and shoulder in a bid to
the jury to increase plaintiff's damages. The evidence
c0ver·ed by defendant's affidavits went dir;ectly to the
question of that damage and whether it had all been
sustained by plaintiff in his accident with defendant's
truck. A jury. might well have been convinced that plaintiff became· involved in the accident with defendants in
an already impaired physical condition, and accordingly minimized by a substantial sum the amolint of the
verdict.
Plaintiff was willing to claim a seriously and permanently impaired memory for the purpose of increasing
his damages, while at the same time claiming the keenest
of memories for the purpose of fixing liability. Such a
person would find no difficulty in denying injury to his
knee and ankle for the purpos·e of bringing hi~self
withi~

' ·

the provisions of an insurance policy while claim-

ing the exact opposite before court and jury.
rrhe jury would have an absolute right, to believe
C. A. Thomas and to disbelieve plaintiff and his doctor.
The trial court may not dictate to a jury which witness·es
it should choose to believe. Jensen vs. Logan City, supra;
IVo·od vs. Wood, supra.
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The matters covered by the affidavits also raise a
serious question of plaintiff's credibility as well as the
eredibility of his wife and doctor. At the trial no hint·
\Hls given that plaintiff had been previously injured or
that he mig·ht have been suffering from the effect of those
injuries on October 10, 1945. No hint or suggestion was
given of another accident just three weeks prior to the
trial of the case which was of sufficient seriousness to
justify a payment of damages to plaintiff. Defendants,
the court and jury were positively led to believe and ·
understand that all damages claimed by plaintiff began
on October 10, 1945 and that he had suffered no other
injuries after that time and prior to the trial. If the
newly discovered evidence covered by defendant's affidavits had been available to defendants at the trial,
its effect as impeachment of plaintiff's case might well
have been devastating. If true, the jury might have been
convinced that plaintiff, his wife and doctor were not
\vorthy of belief on any aspect of the case. Defendants
were entitled to the full impeaching effect of that evidenoo.
Questions involving newly discovered evidence have
been before this court in several cases. In general·it may
he said that four ·elements, if found to exist, are sufficient to support a new trial based upon a showing of
such evidence. Those elements are: (1) diligence in securing the evidence before trial; (2 and _3) that such
evidence is more than cumulative and impeaching in its
effect; and (4) that it is material and likely to change
the result. These pri~ciples are accepted and referred t~
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in the following cases: Klopenstine vs. H,ays, 20 Utah
45; Trimble vs Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142
Pac. 2d 674; Jensen vs. Logan Cty, supra; Vwn Dyke
vs. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161 Pac. 50. See
also WDod vs. Wood, supra.
The evidence shown to exist b);: defendants' affidavits was not cumulative. It was strongly impeaching
in character, as we have herein pointed out, but in addition it was material on t~e very questions of damage
and liability. Furthermore, this evidence, if presented to
a jury, would have probably changed the result of this
case ·in defendants' favor. Finally, the affidavits show
that defendants first became aware of the existence of
the new evidence after the trial and that they had no
reasonable opportunity for knowing Qf its exis~ence before the date of its actual discov·ery. Unless this opportunity is given to the defendants to present ·to a jury evidence newly discovered after the trial,· it will be impossible to ·say that this cas·e was decided upon all of the
facts and evidence which bear upon it.
It is the function of courts to see that justice is done
between litigants and that each shall have full opportunity to be heard upon all the evidence which is material
and competent to a fair and·just decision on the merits.
Whenever it is made to appear that litigants before a
court have not had a fair and impartial trial and that
justice has not been done, it is the duty of such court
to grant a new trial. Denial of a new trial under such
circumstances is an abuse of discretion demanding reversal of the judgment.
\
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· · \Yhile the granting or refusing of the n1otion (n1otion for new trial) lies in the sound discretion of the court, where there is grave sus~
picion that justice may have miscarried because of
lack of enlightenment on a vital point which new
evidence will apparently supply, and the other
ele1nents attendant on obtaining a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence are present, it would be an abuse of sound discretion not
to grant the same. ''
(Jensen vs. Logan City, supra)
'Vhen a verdict is against the gr,eat weight of the
eYidence it is the trial court's right and duty to set the
Yerdict a~ide and grant a new trial. If in such case he
fails to do so he has abused his discretion.
In Valiotis vs. Ut,ah Apex Mitn. Oo., 55 Utah 151,
194 Pac. 802, this court said :
"It is undoubtedly true, as counsel for appellant contend, that the trial judge may and should
set aside a ¥erdict for insufficiency of the evidence and grant a new trial, whenever in his·
judgment the verdict is clearly and palpably
against the weight of the evidence. Not to do so
would be an abus,e of his discr~tion. * * * *
"If it should appear that the evidence on
which the verdict is based is so incredible or inherently improbable or so inconsistent with or
contrary to natural laws or physical facts as
to impel but the one conclusion that the verdict
is the result of mistake, prejudice, or passion,
we 1night then very properly say that the verdict
is not supported by substantial evidence, or that
there is not a substantial conflict of evidence, and
therefore the lower court abused its discretion or
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erred in refusing to grant the new trial. In such
a case we look into the evidence, examine its legal
effect, and opposing logical tendencies, if any,
not for the purpose of deciding the facts, as we
Inay do in equity cases, but to determine whether
or not the trial court erred in its application of
fixed legal principles. "'' ~~ "' *

'' * "" * * If the evidence, taken as a whole, be
reasonably susceptible of opposite conclusions as
to the existence or non-existence of an ultimate
fact, depending upon inferences to be drawn
therefrom, or the weight to he given to the testimony of this or that witness, or set of witnesses,
we must conclusiv·ely presume the fact to be such
as will support the ruling which we are called
upon to review; but, if, after giving due consideration to the fact that the trial judge is better
able to weigh conflicting evidence, the evidence
be such nevertheless as to impel but one reasonable conclusion, and that as to a fact adverse to
the ruling, it would be our duty to so declare, notwithstanding there might be some conflict in the
evidence.'' See also Jensen vs. Logan City, supra.
We will now endeavor to show that the verdict of
the jury was against i:he overwhelming weight of the evidence. In making this statem·ent, defendants do not wish
to be understood as asserting that plaintiff, his Wife and
aunt did not testify that the accident ,was caus·ed by defendants. We propose to show, however, why this testimony was of such little weight that the trial court erred
in refusing to grant a new trial because of the insufficiency of evidence to justify the verdict .
•
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"\Ye preface our argument on this point by stating
were this a case in which the conflicting statements of
witnesses were alone to be consider-ed, ~e r·ecognize that
our proposition would be difficult to maintain. This,
however, is a case where the insufficiency of. I?laintiff's
eYidenee is den10nstrated by the physical facts which
are uncontroverted. The evidence of plaintiff and his
witnesses, when exan1ined in the light of the uncontroverted physical facts, could not be true. The two
could not have co-existence. It is our contention that
~tatements which fly in the face of established physical
fact n1ust be disregarded as evidence.
In Haarstrich vs. 0. 8. L., 70 Utah 552, 262 Pac.
100, this rule has been recognized by this court. In that
case it was argued that the testimony of a certain witness supported a verdict in plaintiff's favor. This court,
however, held that the .testimony of the witness in question should be entirely disregarded. The rule was announced in this language:

"* * * * It only need be stated here that the
testimony of Mr. Howlett in that. respect flies
in the face of uncontroverted phy~ical facts and
therefore is not substantial evidence *' * '.'

*

It was held in that case that defendant was entitled to

a new trial.
The statem·ent of the rule now leads us to consider
the physical fiwts of this case which we deem to be
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erringly where upon the highway the accident actually
occurred are the following:
1. The right wheel marks 1nade by the truck upon
the right shoulder of the highway from the southwest
corner of' the bridge, in unbroken continuity to the place
where defendant's truck came to rest in the right barrow
pit. These wheel marks were positiv·ely identified by defendant Rogers and by Officers Reese and Gray (Tr.
202, 233-236, 239, 253, 254, 260, 261, 263, 264). The existence and identification of these tracks was not seriously
challenged by plaintiff.

2. The location of the debris deposited upon the
center of the highway by the collision ('Tr. 230, 231, 232,
246, 248, 249, 2'62, 263). ·There is no ·evidence in the record which shows that this debris was not deposited exactly where defendant Rogers and the two police officers
said it was.
3. The po~ition of plaintiff's automobile after the
accident in the approximate center of the highway with
the left front wheel extending two to three feet over the
center line (Tr. 181, 182, 189, 202, 229, 230, 262). All of
these facts show that 'the collision did not occur upon
plaintiff's side of the highway.
It is true that plaintiff produced witnesses who testi-

fied of physical facts which were calculated to support
plaintiff's theory of the accident. The basis of this testimony was destroyed, however, by uncontroverted testimony which proved that the observations upon which the
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tt:>~tiinony

was based rested upon false assumptions of

fact.
The witnesses Blaine l\Ioser, I-Iickn1an, l\lcl\lurdie
and Haws went upon the scene of the accident the morning following its occurrence. It was their purpose to
prove that defendants caused the accident. They first
located the pile of debris upon the easterly shoulder of
the highway. Immediately they adopted the theory that
this pile of debris marked the spot where the collision
had occurred. \Yith this false assumption finnly implanted in their minds .these witnesses proceeded to
look for other indicatio~s of the place of in1pact. They
a3~ert that they saw wheel 1narks upon the highway
which seemed to them to point in the direction of defendant's truck. They put the two assumptions together and
can1e to the conclusion that the accident occurred on the
easterly side of the highway (Tr. 72, 75, 79, 105, 106,
111, 148, 150, 151, 154, 159, Ex. "D," 160, 165, 167, 169,
170).
That the first of these assumptions was false was
established by the uncontroverted testh:nony of the highway officers that they had the night before removed the
debris from the point of impact in the middle of the
road to a place near the southeast edge of the highway.
Another assumption of the same witnesses with respect
to tire marks on the highway was likewise completely
destroyed by uncontroverted evidence. They saw tire
marks across the highway and laboring under the false
assun1ption that the collision occurred where the officers
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had deposited the debris they concluded the tire marks
had been n1ade by defendant's truck. But they were looking at tire marks which had been made by heavy road
equipment when it backed across the highway in pulling
defendant's truck upright before plaintiff's witnesses
ever arrived upon the scene.
Furthermore, several vehicles were at the scene of
the accident im1nediately after it happened, and many
more must have gone by between the time of the accident and the arrival of plaintiff's witnesses (Tr. 230,
232, Ex. "D," 246, 247, 249, 262, 263, 205, 237, 238, 260,
244, 228, 185) .
The record shows that plaintiff's witnesses failed to
identify with any certainty whatever the wheel marks
which they say were to be seen the following day upon
the highway as having been made by defendant's truck.
They were content to assume that because the tire marks
pointed in the general direction of defendant's truck this
was sufficient proof that they had been made by the
truck. They did not examine the tire n1arks they saw and
cmnpare them \vith tires on the truck to make certain
that they were the same. Nor did they follow them all
the way across the highway from the debris to the truck
itself. On the other hand, defendant Rogers and two of
the police officers made certain that the tire tracks which
they discovered upon the right shoulder of the highway
had been made by the truck by making careful comparison between those tire marks and the tires on the
truck and by following the marks to the truck. This
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233 to 236, 253,

•

In addition to the testimony of Blaine :Moser, Hickumn, :Jic:Jiurdie and Haws being contrary to the physical facts of the accident, these state1nents contain glaring inconsistencies in and of themselves. These witnesses
speak of finding· skid 1narks upon the highway. 'They
undertook to identify them in Exhibit "D." In this they
failed. That there were none is conclusively shown (Tr.
231). Xeither driver testified that brakes were applied
at all.
Blaine :Jioser made the assertion that the wheel
1uarks which he believed but did not establish were made
by the truck, left the highway at a 60 degree angle ( Tr.
18). The uncontroverted evidence shows that the truck
was almost exactly parallel with the highway when it
came to rest. If the truck had left the highw~y at the
acute angle of 60 degrees after having been struck by
the plaintiff's automobile and was from then on out o"f
control, it is not to he presumed that it would have com·e
to rest in a position parallel to the highway.
There was a reason why Blaine Moser and plaintiff's
other witnesses attempted to establish an acute angle
for the truck to leave· the highway. It was consistent with
the statements made by plaintiff, his wife and aunt for
them to do so. The latter three witnesses were claiming
that defendant's truck attempted to get out of the path
of plaintiff's car by swerving at an extremely acute
angle. There was no proof submitted to show that the
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truck could possibly have been driven so as to do this 'in
the time and space r·equired 'by plaintiff's testimony. The
maneuver described would have had to be executed within
the space of 60 feet ( Tr. 61, 62, Ex. "F "). We assert that
it was an utter impossibility for it 1:o have done so. Ftlrthermore, the record shows that there was no positive
identification of the wheel. marks supposedly seen upon
the highway with the truck itself. We have pointed out
that the record in this respect shows that Blaine :Moser,
Hickman, McMurdie and Haws only stated that these
wheel marks went in the direct~on of the truck. It is
without dispute that a heavy truck backed across the
highway. Any wheel marks that may have been seen
crossing the highway must have be·en those made by the
heavy road ·equipment which was ba'cked across the
highway in pulling the truck chassis upright.
Mrs. Jones, plaintiff's aunt, had her eyes shut until
just a split s·econd before the actual impact occurred
·which renders any statement of hers with respect to location of the vehicles upon the highway- extremely unreliable. Mrs. Jones testified on rebuttal upon direct examination by plaintiff's counsel as follows:

'' Q~ Will you state to the court and jury as neur ,
as you can, what ~e (Edwards) said to you
and what you said t.o hin1r
A.

He asked m·e what happened, and I said I
didn't know what happrened. I knew I saw
this bill board directly in front of us. Previous to that I didn't know." (Tr. 282-283)
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Plaintiff's statement described something which was
an impossibility. He states that he was within a foot or
two of the easterly side of the highway when the collision occurred (Tr. 36). Yet after the collision plaintiff's
car was almost exactly in the center o£ the highway with
its front end over the center line. If, the impact had occurred where plaintiff claims· it did then his car would
have been on the extreme easterly side of the highway
and not in the middle of it where it was found after the
collision. Furthermore he asserted he was but 60 feet
:from the truck when it abruptly came over onto his side
of the highway. At his speed ~f 45 miles per hour and
the truck's speed of 40 miles per hour, the truck could
never have been maneuvered in such a way as to get the
front end of it out of the way before the impact. Yet the
front end of the truck was undamaged and it is admitted
by ·everyone that the impact came just in front of the
left rear dual wheels of the truck ( Tr. 35, ·5'7, 58, 6'2,
202, Ex. "B"). The impossibility of what plaintiff describes is further emphasized by the fact that no brakes
were applied on either vehicle. Add to this the "foggy"
condition of plaintiff's memory (Tr. 145) and what have
you left of what could be described as a substantial conflict of ·evidence~ On the condition of plaintiff's memory
we believe we may fairly add that either he could have
no clear memory of the ev;ents of the accident or else
the condition of his m·e~ory was misrepresented in order
ro enhance his damages, and either way you take it, this
testimony is extr·emely questionable.
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There remains only the testimony of plaintiff's wife
to consider on this aspect of the case. She loyally repeats
the statement of her husband, the plaintiff, that the
truck just before the accident did just what plaintiff said it did, and that plaintiff was on his side of the
highway. As she describes it (Tr. 8'7) the truck swerved
so sharply that the body would have been nearly at right
angles to plaintiff's automobile. Indeed it presented for
all the world the appearance of a "sign boar~" (Tr.
87, 94, 95). We also question Mrs. Moser's ability to make
accurate observation. Mrs. Moser was knocked at least
partially unconscious, for she says:
'' There was a terrific crash and I pulled
my hand toward my face and there was a terrific
impact. The last thing I remember I had a severe
bump on the back of my head. I was lying outside of the car on the roadway. * * * * Things
were a little vague because I had a terrific blow."
(Tr. 87-88)
Is it unreasonable to assume that she was in such
an upset hysterical condition as to be incapable of careful and correct obsel"vations. In addition, the natural
temptation for Mrs. Moser to be biased n1ust not be
overlooked.
In awarding plaintiff a verdict the jury ignored not
only evidence of physical facts which proved beyond
doubt that defendants were not at fault and that conversely the plaintiff's conduct was the cause, or at the
very least the contributing cause, of the accident, but
also the inconsistencies and 1nistaken assu1nptions of
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plaintiff and his witnesses, and rendered their verdict
entirely out of syn1pathy for the plaintiff.
\Ye earnestly belieYe that in the furtherance of
justice a new trial n1ust be granted.
A~signment

of Erro.r Xo. 2:

\Ye desire to but briefly state defendants' position
''~ith respect to this assignment of error. It is a well

recognized rule of law which we believe requires no
citation of authority that defendants wer,e entitled to
have the jury fully instructed upon all matters of law
pertaining to this case. By refusing to give defendants
requested instruction No. 1, the court committed error,
because the court by so refusing did not instruct upon
a legal proposition pertaining to the case which ,was of
material importance. By said request, the court was
asked to instruct the jury that defendants were not required to make any explanation of how or why the accident in this case occurred and to further instruct the
jury that the burden was upon plaiutiff to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the collision resulted
because of defendants' negligence. The latter part of
this instruction was substantially given by the court, but
the first part of it was not given as requested, nor was
it given in substance. It is submitted that this request
was a proper statement of the law and that it had application to this case. It was not a mere abstract statement of a legal principle. The jury could not have been
misled hy giving it, and it clarified the instruction on
the burden of proof.
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As a corollary to the instruction that the burden
was upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the collision in this case was caused by
defendants' negligence, defendants were entitled to have
the ju~y instructed that it was not incumbent upon them
to give any explanation for the happening of the accident. The purpose of such an instruction was to make
it perfectly clear to the jury that no inferences of any
kind were to be indulged by the jury against the defendants in the event the jury was not fully satisfied
as to what caused the accident.
The following cases contain examples of instructions similar to the 6ne requested by defendants which
have had approval by the courts. In Doherty vs. St. Louis
Butter Oomparny, !.Hssouri 98, ·S.W. 2d 742, the following
instruction was held to be proper:

'' * * * * It does not devolve upon the defendant to dispr:ot:e said charge (of negligence), but
rather the law casts the burden of proof in reference to said charge upon the plaintiff and said
charge of negligence must be sustained by the
preponderance, that is, the greater weight of the
credible evidence, to the satisfaction of the jury.
* * * *"
Likewise in the case of Sullivan vs. J.l!inne·apolis
Ry. Co., ~finn. 220 N.W. 922, an instruction in substance
the same as the one r·equested by defendants, was held
to be proper. It was stated in the following language:
''Negligence is neyer pr·esumed · the burden
of proof in this case is on plaintiff t~ prove by a
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fair preponderance of the evidence, both the
neg·ligence of the defendant and the mnount and
seriousness of her injuries. The defendant never
has to disprore negli.gcnoe; that is, the burden
of proof, as I have already explained, is on plaintiff to show negligence.''
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case shows conclusively that
plaintiff was injured in a collision with defendant's
truck because he drove his automobile on the wrong
side of the highway. There is no substantial evidence that
::;upports any of the charges of negligence made against
defendants.
Because the verdict of the jury is not supported by
the evidence, and because the trial court committed error
in (lenying defendants' motion for new trial based upon
newly discovered ,evidence and insufficiency of evidence
to support the verdict and in refusing to give defendants'
requested instruction No. 1, the judgment of the trial
court should be reversed . and defendant should be
awarded a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QIDNNEY & NEBEKER,
Attorneys for Defendants
and A ppelZants
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